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trasted to theory, "the actual situation is: what may be considered morally bad
law by philosophers is taken to be legally valid law by lawmen until it is re2
pealed or overruled" (p. 83). This does not quite answer the question.
ORvnLL C. SNYDER*
It may be instructive to note experience with the somewhat similar theories that a statute
judicially held unconstitutional is to be viewed as if it was never enacted, and that an overruled
judicial precedent never was law. See SNYDER, PREFAcE To JURISPRUDENcE 355, 359-60,
418-19, 428 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.

Bank Credits and Acceptances. By Wilbert Ward and Henry Harfield. New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 4th ed., 1958. Pp. vii, 277. $7.00.
The appearance of a new edition of Ward & Harfield would at any time be
an event of some importance for the student and practitioner in the field of
letters of credit. However, the many changes in letter of credit operations produced by the upsurge of domestic and foreign trade following the conclusion
of World War II and the need for a cogent and comprehensive analysis of these
changes make its advent especially welcome at this time.'
Unfortunately, the book itself does not live up to expectations. By and
large, the authors fail to shed much light on the new situations which have
arisen in this area, and their analysis of the practices which have developed in
the last decade is in many instances inadequate and in some cases actually
misleading.
One example of the many deficiencies in the book is found in the discussion of
the conformity of the bill of lading to the documentary specifications laid down
in the letter of credit. Although most credits invariably call for a "clean" bill
of lading from the seller, the meaning of this term is far from clear. While most
definitions, especially those advocated by the banking community, refer to a
clean bill of lading as being one which contains nothing in the margin which
qualifies the document itself,2 such definitions are for the most part too broad.
They do not grapple in any way with the real problem of the carrier's claused
or superimposed notations and the fact that the carrier is seldom so careless
as to his liability to fail to note every defect possible in the goods delivered to
him and to qualify the bill accordingly.3
'The third edition of Ward & HarfieMd was published in 1948.
This type of definition for the most part reflects the position adopted by the U.S. banking
community in the 1920's. See Draper, What is a "Clean" Bill of Lading?-A Problemin Financing InternationalTrade, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 56, 57 (1951).
3Especially since the inclusion of disclaimer clauses relieving the carrier from liability
for damages arising from his own negligence or fault is made unlawful by the Harter Act
and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190, 191 (1958);
49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1309 (1958).
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While it is clear that the importance of these superimposed clauses varies
considerably in terms of determining whether or not a bill is "clean" within
the meaning of the credit requirements, 4 the authors make no attempt to
analyze these differences. Instead, they put forward the argument that the
banks are always justified in accepting the documents if the rubber-stamped
notations affect only the terms of carriage, and in refusing them if the superimposed statements in any way "negative the apparent good order or condition of the merchandise" (pp. 56-57).1 They further state that any doubt as to
the banker's obligation in this matter would be resolved to a large extent by
adoption of Article 18 of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial
Documentary Credits as promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (pp. 57, 221).6
Such an oversimplification of issues obviously contributes very little to the
resolution of the very difficult problems in this area. As the approach which is
prevalent among most United States' banks, it has led the seller to resort more
and more frequently to the somewhat unhealthy practice of giving indemnities
to the carrier as consideration for the latter's refraining from rubber stamping
or noting the bill of lading in any way.7 Significantly, however, the authors
nowhere allude to this practice or discuss the intricate problems which it can
create."
Article 18 of the Uniform Customs and Practice, which the writers think
will materially assist in settling these difficulties, fails to advance the situation
a great deal. Its definition of a "clean" shipping document as being one "which
bears no superimposed clauses declaring a defective condition of the goods or
packaging" obviously begs the question completely. Furthermore, as another
authority points out, the wording of the article itself is ambiguous; it begins by
4 See Minett, CertainAspects of Bills of Lading and Documentary Credits,74 J. or THK INST.
(1953).
"The authors seem to overlook the fact that a bill of lading containing a claused or rubberstamped notation which, for example, reserves to the shipping company the right to carry
the merchandise on deck is, in the absence of any qualifying provision, not considered "clean."
St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S. A. Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de Janeiro, 263
U.S. 119 (1923).
6The Uniform Customs and Practice for Commerical Documentary Credits were first
codified in 1933 by the International Chamber of Commerce. Subsequent revisions have occurred since then, the last of which was in 1951. Reference throughout the text and footnotes
is to the 1951 revised rules.
7
See, e.g., Continex, Inc. v. The Flying Independent, 106 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
This practice of giving letters of indemnity to carriers against the issuance of "clean" bills
of lading is, however, not entirely new in the field of international trade. See Brown, Jenkinson
& Co., Ltd. v. Percy Dalton (London), Ltd., [19571 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 31, a decision of the
Mayor's and City of London Court which quotes Lloyd's Standard Form of Survey Report
(Goods) as recognizing the practice. See also United Baltic Corp., Ltd. v. Dundee, Perth
and London Shipping Co., Ltd. 11928] 32 Lloyd's List L.R. 272.
s As regards, for example, the question of claiming under an insurance policy for damage
to the goods "incurred in transit."
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authorizing the refusal of documents bearing "reservations" and then proceeds
to define a "clean" document in terms of an absence of "superimposed clauses." 9
The attitude exhibited by the authors with respect to Article 18 of the Uni-.
form Customs and Practice is for the most part typical of their uncritical
approval of these rules generally and their advocacy of their adoption as a
method of solving many of the problems and ambiguities present in most documentary credits. That such approval is something less than warranted is shown
by the fact that the British banks which handle almost half of international
credit transactions 0 have refused, for reasons which are in most instances more
than justifiable, to adhere to these rules."
In addition to the British rejection, however, the authors' own criticisms of
the more general aspects of the letter of credit are not always consistent with
the practices advocated by the Uniform Customs. For example, while rightly
condemning the revocable credit as being an instrument lacking in commercial
utility (p. 15), they completely ignore the fact that Article 3 of the Uniform
Customs and Practice states that "all credits, unless clearly stipulated as
irrevocable, are considered revocable even though an expiry date is specified."'1
Apart from such oversimplification and inconsistencies, the book, as already
stated, is in some areas actually misleading. The statement that there is little
question as to the present existing rule of law as to the bank's obligation and
liability concerning fraudulent and forged documents (p. 56) is not accurate.
While the rule suggested by the authors that a bank should be protected when
making payment in good faith against documents which appear to be genuine
on their face is one which should obviously be applied (p. 56), the cases do not
reflect the unequivocal certainty which the authors regard as existing in this
area. The case of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., 13 in

which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a warehouse receipt which
is forged is not a "warehouse'receipt" entitling the holder to reimbursement,
even though it appeared regular on its face, suggests at least one line of argument which could be used to attack their proposition.
The writers' statement as to the certainty in the law in this area also overlooks the doubt that exists at the present time as to whether any type of alteration of a document is sufficient to make it fraudulent and thus justify non9GuTr=RmGE &M EGRAH,
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U See GUTTERmGE & MEGRAH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 79; Rice & Thorne, The Uniform
Customs 6" Pracliefor CommercialDocumentary Credits, 56 CAN. BANKER 53 (No. 3) (1949);
Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The Need for Uniform Legislation, 23 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 571
(1956).
2 For an examination of the difficulties which this can create for the unsuspecting.beneficiary, see Mentschikoff, supra note 11, at 589-96.
13297 Fed. 152 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 585 (1923).

19601

BOOK REVIEWS
4

acceptance.' Furthermore, it ignores the question raised by Judge Cardozo's
strong dissenting opinion in Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park .Bank'5 as
to whether prior knowledge of substantial defects in the goods shipped requires the bank to refuse the documents.
While the book still remains the most important American contribution in
the area of letters of credit, it is to be regretted that in their new edition the
authors did not examine in greater detail and with greater care the perplexing
problems which have arisen in this field in the last ten or fifteen years, Such
matters as assignment, partial payment and the problem of notation and the
exhaustion of the credit, the difficult problems of insurance, the application of
the Uniform Customs and Practice, indemnities and other aspects of these instruments urgently require detailed analysis to show the way to both bankers
and lawyers alike. Unfortunately, such analysis is lacking in this present work.
As a basic introduction, Ward & ifarfieldstill occupies a preeminent position in
the literature. However, at this stage something more than just an introduction
is needed: something that will do proper justice to the coming of age of this most
useful and versatile of credit instruments.
NoRMAN I. MILLER*
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schoeder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (S.
Ct. 1941); Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, Ltd. [1954] 1 All E.R. 779 (K.B.).
15239 N.Y. 386, 402, 146 N.E. 636, 641 (1925).
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
14See

